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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
2
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

3

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.'
AD MIRALTY.

Practice-Amendment of Libel on Appeal to the Circuit Court- Collision-Evidence-Findigs of Board of Local Inspectors.-Where
certain claims for damage were rejected by the District Court because
not included in the original libel, held, that the Circuit Court on appeal
could in its discretion permit libellants to file a supplemental and
amended libel setting up such claims: The North Carolina, 15 Pet. 40,
distinguished: The Charles Morgan, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
The findings of the board of local inspectors, and the documents connected therewith, in a proceeding instituted under Rev. Stat., seec. 4450,
for an investigation of the facts connected with a collision, so far as
they had a bearing on the conduct of the licensed officers on board the
boats, are inadmissible in a collision suit in admiralty when offered by
the defendants as tending to affect the evidence offered by the libellants
to show that their boat was in her proper position and had proper watches
and lights set at the time of the collision : Id.
AGENT.

See Bank; Common Carrier.

Contract-Association of Railroad Companies-Partnership-Contract by one Company, whether Binding on all--Rebate of .M'eihtEvidence-Ratification.-Where a combination or association of three
or four different railroad companies is formed for the transportation of
freight and the transaction of the business of a common carrier, which
is conducted by the general managers of each of the component companies, as in the case of a partnership, so long as one of the companies
acts within the general scope of its powers in making contracts or performing other acts on behalf of the association, the association itself
will be bound, although the particular company acting for it has exceeded its authority, as tested by its laws or articles of association: The
Erie and Pacific Despatch v. Cecil, 112 11.
A contract of a railway company or association of such companies,
made by its usual agents, with a shipper, to ship and carry a large
quantity of grain at a reduced rate, which is five cents on the hundred
pounds less than the customary rates, but that the same should be billed
at the regular rates then current and the freight paid at the latter rates,
the difference in the two rates to be forthwith paid back to the shipper
is valid and binding on the company or companies making the same: Id.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 115 U. S. Rep.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 112 111. Rep.
3 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 63 Md. Rep.
4 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 138 Mass. Rep.
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In a suit against an association of railway companies on a contract
made by a local agent of one of the companies, the defendant offered in
evidence the articles of agreement between the several companies composing the association, for the purpose of showing a want of power in
the local agents to make the contract: .Held, that they were not admissible in evidence against the plaintiff, as the public could not be bound.
by them, or the rules and regulations they might contain: Id.
To prove the ratification of a special contract made by a station agent
of a railway company in this state, which company, with others, constituted an association in the nature of a partnership, it appearing that
the general manager of the same company approved such contract, the
plaintiff offered in evidence three telegrams between the general manager of the railway company and the general manager of the association,
showing that though the first had exceeded his orders, the latter would
protect him: Held, that the telegrams were competent evidence on
that question: Id.
Where the general manager of an association of railway companies
has notice of the existence and terms of a special contract for transporting grain at a reduced rate, made by an agent of one of the associated companies, and afterward furnishes cars and transports the grain,
this is evidence from which a ratification of the special contract may be
found: .d.
ATTACHMENT.

See Husband and Wife.
ATTORNEY.

Liabilityfor Costs.-An attorney at law, who places his name under
the words "From the office of," on the back of a writ in favor of a resident
of another state, is liable, as endorser, for costs: Morrill v. Lamson,
138 Mass.
If an attorney at law endorses a writ in favor of a resident of another
state, he cannot set up in defence to a scire facias to enforce a judgment for costs awarded against such party, that, in so doing, he violated
a rule of the court, prohibiting an attorney from becoming bail or surety
in any civil suit or proceeding in which he is employed as such attorney : Id.
BANK.
Certificate of Deposit-Principaland Agent-Notice-Subrogation.
-S. S. deposited a sum of money in bank and received a certificate of
deposit, setting forth the deposit of the money by him, and stating that the
same was payable to the order of himself, or of E. S., on the return of
the certificate. Before the money was withdrawn, S. S. died. After
his death, E. S., who was his wife, presented the certificate, and drew
from the bank the amount of the deposit: Held, 1st. That the certificate
of deposit did not authorize the payment of the money to E. S. after.
the death of S. S. 2d. That notice to the paying-teller of the bank,
of the death of S. S., received prior to the payment by him to E. S. of
the amount of the deposit, was notice to the bank. 3d. That if he in
making the payment, after such notice, mistook the law, the bank whose
agent he was, must suffer the consequences. Second Nat. Bank v.
Wrightson, 63 Md.
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The bank filed a bill in equity, to enjoin the prosecution of an action at
law against it for the money deposited by S. S., brought by his executor;
and to have the certificate reformed, as not having been drawn in conformity with the agreement of the parties. The evidence failed to
establish a case for reformation of the certificate, but it was developed
in the proof, that a part of the money drawn by E. S., went directly to
the payment of the debts and funeral expenses of S. S. On appeal it
was Held: That the court below committed no error in retaining the
bill, and under the prayer for general relief, allowing the bank a credit
for the amount of the money drawn by E. S., that went directly to pay
the debts and funeral charges of S. S., and for which the executor had
obtained a credit in his administration account: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.

See Evidence.

CHARITY

CharitableInstitution-Not liablefor wrongful Acts of Employees.The house of refuge, being a corporation instituted for charitable purposes, cannot be made liable in an action for damages, for an assault
committed by one of its officers on an inmate of the institution: Perry
v. The House of Refuge, 63 Md.
Damages cannot be recovered from a fund held in trust for charitable
purposes; they must be recovered from the wrongdoer: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.

See Agent.

Presumptionof Negligence-Burden of Proof-Injury to Passenger
before entering Train.-The carrier is bound to exercise the greatest
care and diligence in everything that concerns the safety of passengers :
and if one is injured by the breaking down or upsetting of the vehicle
used in the transportation, or by the colliding of one train with another,
or by the train running off the track from some defect in the roadbed, in
these, and in other like cases, the evidentiary facts in themselves create
a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier: Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Mahone, 63 Md.
Under such circumstances, the carrier must show that the accident
happened in spite of the exercise by him and his servants, of the greatest degree of care and diligence practicable under the circumstances : Id.
Although the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the injury was occasioned by the negligence of the defendants, yet he discharges this burden and makes out a primafacie case by showing that
the accident happened through the failure of some of the means used
by the carrier in making the transit: Id.
To create the relation of carrier and passenger, it is not necessary
that the latter should actually have entered the train. If he had purchased a ticket and was crossing the track by and under the direction
of the tickei agent, for the purpose of taking the train, he is to be considered as a passenger, and as such entitled to all the rights and protection of one: Id.
Railroad- Conditions of Ticket-Statements of Gatekeeper-Continuous Trip.-Where an excursion ticket is sold by a railroad company
to a passenger at a reduced rate, and upon special conditions, the terms
of which are printed on the ticket; and one of the conditions is that it
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shall be used "1 for a continuous trip only," and " is not good to stop
off,"-the purchaser who accepts and uses it, is bound to take a train
which will carry him continuously through, from one station to the
other, both in going and returning, and not to stop off at an intermediate
station while going either way: Johnson v. Phila., Wilm. & Balto. Railroad Co., 63 Md.
If the passenger on his return knowingly takes a train which does
not go as far as the station at which he purchased his ticket, and with
the intention of stopping off at an intermediate station, the officers of
the company are justified in refusing to accept the return coupon of the
ticket for his fare, and in putting him off the train on his refusal to pay
the regular fare demanded, or to produce a proper ticket to the station
he intended to stop at : Id.
And it is no excuse for his refusal, that he went to one of the gatekeepers at the station where he took the train, who examined his ticket
and negligently assigned him to the wrong train : Ird.
In the absence of proof that the gatekeeper had authority to vary the
terms of contracts for the company, the passenger cannot get rid of the
conditions of his contract by showing that he relied on the actual or
implied direction to take the train, given either through the belief of the
gatekeeper that the ticket was good for the train, or through his negligence, ignorance or mistake : Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Corporation; Husband and Wife.

CORPORATION.

See Removal of Causes.

IndividualLiability of Officersfor Wrongs done by theirorder-Evidence
-Reteption of Servant.-If an officer of a private corporation performs
an illegal act, or such act is performed by his orders where he has authority
to control the servant doing the act, and such illegal act results in injury
to another, the officer directing the act will be individually liable in damages to the injured person: nor will he be exonerated from such liability from the fact that the corporation may also be liable: Peck v.
Cooper, 112 Ill.
Where the president of an omnibus line, an incorporated company,
promulgated an order to its drivers to exclude all colored persons from
riding in their conveyances, and in pursuance of such order a driver
ejected the plaintiff, who was a colored person, from his omnibus, thereby
inflicting a personal injury, it was held, that the president individually
was liable to the plaintiff for the damages received : Id.
The retaining of a servant of a company after knowledge is brought
home to the officer or agent of the company of his misconduct resfilting
in a personal injury to another, or failing to discharge him for negligence, &c., has been held admissible in evidence, when the fact was
known to the officer or agent of the company having power to dismiss
the negligent servant, as characterizing the animus of those controlling
the company, and as an ingi:edient in the measure of damages: I1d.
Liability of Stockholders to Creditors-Bill to enforce-PartiesForeign Receiver.-A foreign insolvent corporation owing debts, if still
in existence, can be compelled, by mandamus or bill in equity, to collect
its unpaid subscriptions wherever the stockholders may reside ; and if
it has ceased to exist, a receiver should be appointed, and the courts of
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other states, as a matter of comity, would recognise the right of the receiver, the same as they would the corporation itself if still in existence,
to prosecute actions at law for the recovery of unpaid subscriptions:
Pattersonv. Lynde, 112 Ill.
Unpaid subscriptions are a trust fund for the payment of the debts of
the corporation, which is the trustee. When, therefore, the corporation
has ceased to exist, then, upon a principle that a trust shall not fail, a
court of equity will take jurisdiction and wind up its affairs: Id.
To enforce the liability of the stockholder for his unpaid stock, it is
indispensable that the corporation (or, if it has ceased to exist, all its
stockholders and creditors), should be before the court so as to be bound
by its orders and decrees, and so that complete justice may be meted
out to all, and all conflicting rights and equities finally adjusted : Id.
A bill was filed in the circuit court by creditors of an insolvent private corporation of the stale of Oregon, against defendants, as stockholders. The complainants alleged the recovery of a judgment at law in
Oregon against the company, and its insolvency, and their inability to
obtain a judgment at law in this state, and also alleged that the defendantF owed large sums on their subscriptions to the capital stock of the
company, and sought a decree against them for the same, to satisfy complainant's demands. The court below sustained a demurrer to the bill:
Held, that the demurrer was properly sustained, for the reason of its
being impossible to acquire jurisdiction of the corporation, and the nonresident stockholders having no property here : Id.
While this court has held that a foreign receiver should not be permitted, as against the claims of creditors resident in another state, to
remove from such state the assets of the debtor, yet when resident creditors have no fixed legal claim to the property, he may be allowed, as a
matter of comity, to remove the same. This is consistent with the right
of a receiver appointed in a foreign state, when creditors have not liens
thereon, to sue in our courts for unpaid subscriptions, and collect the
same, subject to the order of the court appointing him: Id.
Liability for issuing Certificate of Stock-Forged Transfer.-A corporation by issuing stock, declares to the world by its certificate that the
person in whose name it stands is the holder of the number of shares
which the certificate states him to be ; and that it is issued with the
intention that it shall be so used and acted upon; and the company is
thereby liable to any one who has accepted the same and acted thereon
to his injury : .MetropolitanSavings Bank v. Mayor and atjy Council
of Baltinwre, 63 Md.
But it is only to the extent that loss has actually been incurred through
the misrepresentation made by the certificate that it will be made good:
Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Evidence-Identification by Voice alone.-At the trial of a criminal
case, the testimony of a witness, identifying the defendant by his voice,
whom the witness has heard speak only once before the occasion of the
commission of the offence charged, which was after dark, is competent,
and may be considered by the jury in connection with other evidence
of identity: Comrnoiwealth v. Hayes, 138 Mass.

544
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Possession of Stolen Propertgy-Presumption.-Ifpigeons are stolen
from the house in which they were confined by the owner, and are
found in the possession of a person who bought them of another about
two weeks after the larceny, the latter may be convicted of such larceny if his possession of the pigeons is not satisfactorily explained:
Commonwealth v. Deegan, 138 Mass.
DA-MAGES.

Evidence-Pecuniary Circumstancesof Defendant.-On the trial of
an action of trespass for an assault and battery, the plaintiff may give
in evidence the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant to enhance
his damages, and in such case the defendant may give counter evidence
on the subject; but unless such evidence is given by the plaintiff the
defendant has no right to introduce proof on that subject, even in mitigation of damages : fullin v. Spangevberg, 112 I1.
DEED.
Grantor's Control over it until it takes effect.-A mother was induced
by her son, while she was in a feeble state of mind, to execute a deed
to him for her land, including her homestead, under the assurance and
belief that it would not take effect until recorded, and the grantee agreed
not to procure the same to be recorded during the life of the grantor:
Held, the deed would not take effect as to the grantee, and the grantor
might destroy the same at pleasure: Sands v. Sands, 112 .111.
-

DESCENT.

Inheritance of illegitimate (Jhildren-Conflictof Laws.-At common
law a bastard has no right of inheritance, being regarded as filius nulHus; and this rule is in force in this state. A bastard in this state cannot inherit from its father, unless he shall have married the mother and
acknowledged the child as his own, but the child may, under the statute, inherit from its mother : Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill.
The descent and heirship of real estate are exclusively governed by
the laws of the country within which the property is actually situated.
No person can take, except those who are recognised as legitimate heirs
by the laws of that country, and they take in the proportions and the
order which those laws prescribe. Although a bastard may be entitled
in Germany, where born, to inherit from his father, he cannot inherit
real estate from him situate in this state : l.
DEVIsE.
,EJECTMENT.

See Will.

See United States.

EQUITY.
Mistake of Law- When relieved against.-A favorite son, taking advantage of his mother's affection, induced her to make a conveyance of
all her estate to him, upon the assurance of the son that the deed was
in the nature of a will, and would not take effect in her lifetime. The
mother was, at the time, of the age of seventy-three years, and greatly
weakened in the body and mind from disease and sickness, so as to be
incapable of transacting business, and the proof showed the deed was not
intended by her to have effect before her death, but was handed to the
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son to be placed with her papers, and upon her recovery she destroyed
the deed. Held, that the trial court erred in decreeing that the mother
execute another deed in place of the one she had destroyed, and in dismissing her cross-bill to have the conveyance made set aside: Sands v.
,Sands, 112 I1.
See Corporation; CriminalLaw; Damages; Witness.
General Characterof Witness-Presumptionof Payment of Due Bill
held by Maker.-A. party cannot call and examine witnesses to support the general character of another witness, or himself, as a witness,
for truth and veracity, until the character of the witness thus sought to
be supported has been directly assailed. Mere contradictions or different versions by witnesses do not justify the application of the rule that
evidence may be given favorable to a witness' character for truth. It
is only when witnesses are called who testify that his general character
for truth is bad, that witnesses may be introduded in support of his
general character : Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill.
The fact that a due bill is found in the hands of the maker is prima
facie evidence of its payment, and the payee suing on the same is required to overcome the presumption by a preponderance of evidence,
before he can recover. In a suit to recover an alleged indebtedness, the
plaintiff must prove the defendant owes him, by a preponderance of evidence : 17.
And if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
defendant owes him on a due bill, notwithstanding its surrender to the
latter, then the defendant must overcome that evidence by a preponderance, to defeat a recovery : Id.
So it is error to refuse an instruction, in a suit to recover a debt which
is denied by the pleading, that the plaintiff must make and establish his
case by a preponderance of the evidence, and unless he has done so
the jury should find for the defendant: Id.
EVIDENCE.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Witness.

Aarriage-Whatconstitutes.-In the absence of any statutory prohibition, a marriage at common law may be had per verba futuro cum
copula; but the copula must be in fulfiluient of the agreement to
marry, or in consummation of such a contract. The fact that sexual
intercourse occurs after the agreement to marry at some future day, is
not of itself sufficient to establish the marriage relation. To be avail.
ing, the parties, at the time of the copula, must then have accepted
each other as husband and wife: Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Il.
Attachment-Propertyof Wife-Judgment against Railroad for Injuries to Wife.-A judgment obtained by a husband and wife against a
railway company, for injuries sustained by the wife, cannot be attached
foi a debt due by the husband, being exempted from execution in virtue
of sect. 43, of art. 3, of the Constitution, which provides that "the property of the wife shall be protected from the debts of the husband":
Clark v. Wootton, 63 Md.
INSURANCE.

Pleading- Declaration- Assignable lnterest-Assignee-Right to
Sue-complete Premiums-Playment one-half i. Cash and one-half in
VoL. XXXII.-69

546
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Note-Ninety-Days Clause-Interest.-If a declaration on a policy of
life insurance refers to the policy without annexing a copy, and does not
set up any contract inconsistent with the policy, an objection, taken
when the policy is offered in evidence, that there is a variance between
the policy and the declaration, cannot be maintained; Pierce v. Charter
Oak Life Ins. Oo., 138 Mass.
If a declaration on a policy of life insurance, which refers to the policy, is not demurred to, it is no ground of exception to the admission of
the policy in evidence, that the declaration construed in connection with
the policy is ambiguous: Id.
A declaration on a policy of life insurance need not allege facts which
defeat a part of the plaintiff's claim under special provisions of the policy: Id.
A policy of life insurance on the life of A. was payable on his death
to his wife and children, and their assigns; and, if he survived a certain day, was payable to him : Held, that he had an assignable interest
in the policy: Id.
A policy of life insurance provided that, if assigned, written notice
should be given to the insurer. An assignment was made, notice was
given, and the insurer acknowledged notice thereof: Held, that this did
not amount to a promise, on the part of the insurer, to pay the assignee,
and that he could not maintain an action on the policy in his own name:
Id.
A policy of insurance, in consideration of the payment of an annual
premium, insured the life of A. in a certain sum, " or after the due payment of premium for two or more years, if default shall be made in the
payment of any subsequent premium, for as many tenth parts of the
original sum insured as there shall have been complete annual premiums
paid." In the margin of the policy were words and figures denoting
that one-half the annual premium was payable in cash, and one-half by
note: Held, that these words and figures formed part. of the policy, and
that, if annual premiums were paid one-half in cash and one-half by
note, "complete annual premiums" were paid: Id.
In an action at law on a policy of life insurance payable at a day
named in the policy, evidence is inadmissible, in defence, to show that
a different day should have been written: Id.
In an action on a policy of life insurance, payable if the person whose
life is insured survives a certain day, the plaintiff can recover interest
only from the date of the writ, unless in his declaration he alleges a
demand before that time: Id.
If a policy of life insurance is payable ninety days after due notice
and satisfactory evidence of the death of the person whose life is insured, or, if he survives a certain day, is then payable to him, the
ninety-days clause has no application to the latter contingency, and interest is not payable except as damages for wrongfully withholding the
money: Id.
Mutual Benevolent Association-Death Assessment-Forfeiture of
Membership-Notice-Sikness as an Excuse for Default- Waiver.-Y.
was a member of a Mutual Benevolent Association, whose object was to
provide and maintain a fund for the benefit of the widows and orphans of
deceased members. By one of its articles it was provided that upon the
death of a member of the association, the secretary should notify each
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member, and thereupon each member should "within thirty days from
the date of said notice pay to the secretary the sum of one dollar and
ten cents, and in case he neglect or refuse to pay the same, his name
shall be erased from the roll of members, and he shall forfeit all claims
upon the association ; nevertheless any member may be reinstated by
giving such excuse himself or through his representative, for failing to
pay his assessment as may be satisfactory to the board of directors." It
was further provided that "a notice directed and sent to the post-office
address or to the residence of a member as recorded in the books of the
secretary, shall be deemed a legal notice." On the 29th of August 1882,
a notice of that date of assessments for and in respect of the death of
two members, was directed and sent to the post-office address of Y., requiring him to pay said assessments within thirty days from the date of
such notice. No payment or tender of the assessment was made, and
Y. died two days after the expiration of the thirty days from the
date of the notice. He was taken sick on the 13th of September
1882, and was for the most of the time between that date and the
time of his death, in a state of delirium, and entirely incapable of attending to business. In an action against the association, brought by
the widow of Y., it was held: 1st. That the obligation to pay the death
assessment was personal to the member, and the payment was to be made
by him as such, and in case of his default he ceased to be a member,
and forfeited all claim upon thQ association. 2d. That the notice directed to Y. having been duly mailed on the day of its date, there was
no necessity for proving its actual receipt by him. 3d. That the full
thirty days having expired without payment, and the party having died
two days thereafter, he was not a member at the time when he died,
having by his default lost his membership and all the benefits appertaining thereto. 4th. That the fact that he was part of the time sick
and wholly unable to attend to business, constituted no sufficient legal
excuse for the default whereby this consequence was produced. 5th.
That there was nothing in the case that could be fairly construed to
operate as a waiver on the part of the association, of its right to insist
upon the forfeiture under said article: Yoe v. Benjamin C. Howard
.Masonie Xut. Ben. Ass., 63 Nd.
MALIOIOUS PROSEOUTION.
FalseImprisonment-ImproperMotive-Lawful Warrant.-A person
who has procured the arrest and imprisonment of another on a lawful
warrant is not liable to an action for false imprisonment, although his
object in making the complaint upon which the warrant was issued was
to enforce the payment of a debt: Mullen v. Brown, 138 Mass.
M1ASTER AND SERVANT.

See Corporation.

MECHANICs' LIEN.

What required to give a Lien on Propertyof a Railroad Company.
-Ordinary lien laws giving to mechanics and laborers a lien on buildings, including the lot upon which they stand, or a lien upon a lot or
farm or other property for work done thereon, or for materials furnished
in the construction or repair of buildings, should not be interpreted as
giving a lien upon the roadway, bridges, or other property of a railrdad
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company, that may be essential in the operation and maintenance of its
road for the public purposes for which it was established : Buncombe
County Commissioners v. Tommey, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
MORTGAGE.

Account between Mortgagor and Mortgagee-Adverse Possession by
Mortgagee.-As between mortgagor and mortgagee, where the latter is
in possession in the acknowledged character of mortgagee, the principles
are plain and well defined, and are applied for the mutual benefit of
both parties. But where the possession is held adversely to the mortgagor, with denial of the right of redemption, the principles of the account are quite different, and are applied with more or less rigor against
the wrongdoer, according to the circumstances of the, case : Booth v.
Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 63 Md.
Purchase by/ Mortgagee-Merger-Foreclosureof subsequent Jlfortgage.-If the owner of land, who holds it subject to two mortgages made
by his predecessors in title, conveys it, reserving an easement therein, to
the first mortgagee, by a warranty deed, in which the grantee assumes
and agrees to pay both mortgages and to hold the grantor harmless therefrom, the first mortgage is extinguished; a foreclosure of that mortgage
by a sale under a power contained therein, is invalid ; and the second
mortgagee may maintain a writ of entry against the first mortgagee to
foreclose the second mortgage: JKneeland v. Moorem, 138 Mass.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Common Carrier; Corporation.

OFFICER.

See Corporation.

PARTITION.

Right to-Discretionof 0ourt.-Where a case is fairly brought within the law authorizing a partition, the right to partition is imperative,
and absolutely binding upon courts of equity. They are not clothed
with such discretion as that, under a given state of facts, they may
grant the relief or refuse it, and yet commit no error. To invoke this
equitable remedy is a matter of right, and not of mere grace: Hill v.
Reno, 112 Ill.
In the event that a partition could be effected only through the instrumentality of a sale of the premises and a distribution of the proceeds
of such sale among the several parties in interest, the mere fact that
difficulties may arise in the adjustment of the distribution, or inconveniences, or even possible losses result from the change in the relations
of the parties to the estate, by reason of a sale, will in nowise affect the
absolute right to have partition. Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

See Agent.

Notice of Dissolution-Evidence-In an action ugainst the members
of a partnership upon a promissory note, and on an account annexed for
goods sold and delivered, if one of the issues is whether the plaintiff
had notice of the dissolution of the partnership, a notice of such dissolution published in a newspaper is competent, in conuection with other
evidence tending to show that the plaintiff saw and read the notice
Smith v. Jackman, 138 Mass.
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In an action against the members of a partnership upon a promissory
note, and on an account annexed for goods sold and delivered, one of
the issues was whether the plaintiff had notice of the dissolution of the
partnership. He testified that he had no knowledge of such dissolution
until after the bringing of the action. One of the partners, who alone
defended the action, was allowed to put in evidence certain bills or statements of account for goods sold and delivered to him personally by the
plaintiff at various times after the cause of action had accrued. Held,
that the plaintiff had no ground of exception : I.
PATENT.

Re-issue-Delay in applyingfor-Decison of Patent Office- General
Denurrer.-The bill set out the grant of the original letters patent and
their invalidity by reason of an insufficiency or defect in the specificatien which had arisen through inadvertence, accident or mistake; their
surrender and the granting of re-issued letters, after a decision by the
patent office board of appeal that the delay in the application for the reissue (more than five years) had been sufficiently and satisfactorily explained, and that there was not in the renewed application any attempt
to enlarge the scope of the invention beyond what was originally disclosed. On general demurrer, held: that the question whether the delay had been reasonable or unreasonable was for the court to determine,
that the decision of the patent office could not avail the complainant, and
that no special circumstances having been shown to account for and excuse the delay the re-issue must be considered void and the bill dismissed: Wallersak v. .Reihrer, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
POSSESSION.

Adverse Possession by Fraudulent Grantor as against Grantee-Evidence-Assessment of Taxes.-If A. is entitled to a conveyance of land,
and, by an agreement between A. and B., in order to defraud A.'s creditors, the land is conveyed to B., a title to the land by adverse possession
of more than twenty years may be acquired by A. against B., although
A. is without means to pay his debts during such possession, if B.
knows that A. is holding the land adversely and under a claim of right
during his possession: Elwell v. Hinckley, 138 M1ass.
At the trial of a writ of entry, if the demandant relies upon a title
acquired by his grantor by adverse possession, the books of the assessors
of taxes of the town in which the land lies are admissible in evidence
for the purpose of showing that the land was assessed to the demandant's
grantor during the period of the alleged adverse possession : Id.
RAILROAD.

See Agent; Common Carrier; Mechanics' Lien.
RECEIVER.

See Corporation.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Separate Controversy- Contest over Ownership of Stock- The Corporation a Necessary Fart.-A suit in equity brought by C., a citizen
of one state, against the corporation of the same state, and T., a citizen
of another state, and W., to obtain a decree that C. owns shares of the
stock of the corporation standing in the name of W., but sold by him
to T., and that the corporation cancel on its books the shares standing

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

in the name of W., and issue to C. certificates therefor, cannot be removed by T. into the Circuit Court of the United States, under section
2 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 St. 479); because the corporation is
an indispensable party to the suit, and is a citizen of the same state with
C.: Cruhp v. Thurber, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Corporations Created by the United States-Suits arising under the
Laws thereof.-Such corporations as the Union Pacific Railway Company
and the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, created by and organized
under Acts of Congress, are entitled, under the act of March 3d 1875,
to remove suits brought against them in the state courts, into the United
States Circuit Courts, on the ground that such suits are suits "arising
under the laws of the United States :" Pacific Railroad Removal
Cases, S. C. U. S. Oct., Term 1884.
Separate Controversy-Actions in Tort against several Defendants
whofile separateAnswers.-An action for damages for the malicious prosecution of a previous action, which had been commenced by a writ of attachment brought in a state court against several defendants who separate in their answers, cannot be removed under the second clause of § 2
of the act of March 3, 1875, into the United States Circuit Court by one
party of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs and themselves
are citizens of different states and that there is in the cause a controversy wholly between them: Pirne v. Toedt, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
SUBROGATION.

See Bank.

UNITED STATES.

Pre-emption Land-Patent therefor--lmpeachment of.-It is the
duty of the land department, of which the secretary of the interior is
the head, to determine whether land patented to a settler is of the class
subject to settlement under the pre-emption laws, and his judgment as
to this fact is not open to contest by a mere intruder without title,
in an action at law brought by the patentee to recover possession
Ehrhardt v. .Hogaboon, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
Jurisdiction- Citizenship- Creditor's Sale-Addition as Plaintiffs
of Citizens of the same State as Defendants.-A United States Court
having obtained jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship of a creditor's
bill, will not lose it because others are added as plaintiffs, and it does
not thereafter appear that the controversy is wholly between citizens of
different states. Other creditors coming in under such a bill can either
become co-complainants, or appear before the master under a decree ordering a reference to prove the claims of all persons entitled to the benefit of the decree: Stewart v. Dunham, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
WITNESS.

Prochein Ami-Hnsband andWife.-Aprochein ami is not a party to
the suit within the meaning of the clause of the Evidence Act, which declares that where an original party to a contract or cause of action is
dead, or where an executor or administrator is a party to the suit,
neither party shall be admitted to testify on his own offer, or upon the
call of his co-complainant or co-defendant otherwise than now by law
allowed, unless a nominal party merely: Traherav. Golburn, 63 Md.

